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Abstract 
The cyber-security of organisations is a subject of perennial concern as they are subject to 
mounting threats in an increasingly digitalised world. While commercial and charitable 
organizations have been the objects of cyber security research, Social Enterprises have 
remained unexplored. As Social Enterprises have become increasingly important features of 
social and economic development, so their prominence as potential targets of cybercrime also 
increases.  
In order to address this knowledge gap, this study examines the factors that influence the 
cyber-preparedness of Social Enterprises in the UK. Through the use of semi-structured 
interviews with Social Enterprise, these factors are found to comprise the characteristics of 
the enterprise, the characteristics of the enterprise management, resource constraints, 
experience of cyber attacks, usage of IT, and awareness of cybersecurity schemes and 
resources. These insights provide valuable guidance for SE owner-managers, SE support 
agencies and policy-makers when considering the cyber security of SEs. 
These findings are of immediate concern to social enterprises but also to other organizations 
that are engaged in partnerships with them as social enterprises may afford ‘gateway’ 
opportunities to those with malicious intent. 
Managerial Relevance 
Social Enterprises are institutions that balance the competing needs of commercial success 
and the primary objective of delivering social value. The management of cyber security 
places a further demand upon these resource-constrained organizations, and upon the 
capacity of individual owner-managers. However, the nature of these enterprises suggests 
that they present unique opportunities to cyber criminals: their association with vulnerable 
individuals, use of volunteer resources and links with government systems, and rising 
visibility among the business landscape, makes their management of cyber security a pressing 
issue. This study has identified a general lack of awareness of cyber security reporting 
requirements, preventive measures and support schemes among social enterprises in the 
United Kingdom. Organizations that represent social enterprises, and local and national 
governing bodies, need to review the efficacy of their current methods of communicating 
with and educating this increasingly important sector. However, social enterprise owner-
managers must also take responsibility for raising their own awareness of the current 
regulations and for effecting appropriate cyber security management within their 
organizations. This may be aided by the collaborative activity of groups of social enterprises, 
for instance, among those that operate within defined Social Enterprise Places, or among 
other collective arrangements. 
KEY WORDS: social enterprise, cyber security, cyber crime 
Introduction 
The continued development and adoption of internet technologies and devices has sparked a 
concomitant increase in the research and development of methods for detecting and 
understanding cyber-crime (Chaffey and White, 2011; Stephens, 2005) as well as 
technological solutions for preventing digital crimes (see for example White, 2017). A 
significant proportion of the literature on cyber-crime explores the context of commercial 
organisations but comparatively little of that is of a scholarly nature (Paoli, Visschers and 
Verstraete, 2018).  
To date, no research has been conducted that explores cyber-crime in the context of Social 
Enterprises (SE). This is significant since SEs are becoming an increasingly important 
element of modern society. SEs are a form of organisation that aim to fulfil some pertinent 
social purpose through commercial means (Doherty et al, 2014; Peattie and Morley, 2008). 
Frequently termed ‘hybrid’ organizations due to their dual social and commercial mission, 
the majority of profits that they generate are reinvested in order to ‘respond to the need of 
others’ (Dees, 2012, 321): for example, cafes that provide ‘experience and accredited 
training’ for homeless people (Café from Crisis, 2020). The number of SEs in the United 
Kingdom (UK) rose by 33% between 2012 and 2015: 52% of them reported a growth in their 
turnover while 59% offered a new product or service in the last year (Villeneuve-Smith and 
Temple, 2015). UK SEs operate in over eighteen different industries, 76% of them break 
even or make a profit and 41% of them create new jobs, predominantly for disadvantaged 
people (Villeneuve-Smith and Temple, 2015). Consequently, these organizations are rapidly 
emerging as an economically as well as socially significant sector of activity. 
In addition to their nascent role in social and economic development, SEs exhibit several 
characteristics that further suggest that their ability to manage cyber-security requires 
examination - 
First, SEs often have a lack of financial and professional resources compared to commercial 
organisations (White, Samuel, Pickernell, Taylor and Mason-Jones, 2018; Rey-Marti, 
Ribeiro-Soriano and Palacios-Marques, 2016; Katre and Salipante, 2012). Furthermore, they 
typically employ individuals with low levels of skills (Rey-Marti et al., 2016; Richards and 
Reed, 2015; Doherty et al., 2014; Lui, Takeda and Ko, 2014). SEs are therefore unlikely to 
possess the internal skills and capabilities to manage cyber-security weaknesses, nor are they 
likely to possess the financial resources to hire such skills (Martin 2015; Lehner and Nicholls, 
2014; Reiser and Dean, 2014).  
Second, the employment of individuals with low levels of skill makes SEs open to social 
engineering attacks (Bullee, Montoya, Pieters, Junger and Hartelk, 2018). It may also result 
in the improper use of data and information technologies, for example, through unintentional 
disclosure of sensitive data, or the use of information systems in a manner that circumvents 
policy or security measures (Ani, He and Tiwari, 2019).  
Third, SEs are likely to be in possession of the details of the organisations and vulnerable 
individuals that they serve or employ (Doherty, Haugh and Lyon, 2014; Samuel, White, 
Jones and Fisher, 2018). This information may be highly detailed and contain sensitive data 
such as personal histories, criminal records or medical conditions. While the protection of 
personal data is an issue of concern for all organisations it is evident that the nature of SEs 
makes them notable targets for the malicious acquisition of data. Furthermore, SEs are 
frequently employed by local authorities to service the social needs that have become 
exposed during a period of global austerity: almost half of SEs trade with the public sector 
(SEUK, 2019). Consequently, SEs may be in possession of sensitive government data and 
become portals for access to important government systems. 
Collectively, SEs represent an influential sector of commerce that are imbued with notable 
characteristics that make them not only susceptible to cyber-attack but also the organisation 
and the individuals with whom they engage have the potential to be harmfully impacted by 
their effect. Their increasing presence as socially and commercially viable and successful 
organisations, for instance 52% of UK social enterprises grew their turnover in the last year 
(SEUK, 2019), may also be conspiring to raise awareness of their vulnerabilities to those 
with malicious intent. Therefore, as their popularity increases this may increase their 
prominence as subjects of cyber crime: a trajectory that has been witnessed in the growth of 
cyber crime against larger charitable organizations (Charity Commission, 2019). 
This paper therefore aims to understand the factors that influence the cyber-preparedness of 
social enterprises in the UK. In achieving this goal, the paper systematically unpacks the 
factors that support and hinder the preparedness of SEs to deal with cybercrime. The paper is 
structured as follows: first, a review of the cyber-crime literature is presented before the key 
issues and the characteristics of SEs are formulated as a conceptual framework and research 
questions. Following this the methods of the study are detailed before the findings of the 
analyses are presented. The paper closes with statements of contributions and suggestions for 
future research. 
Cyber-crime 
Cyber-crime is a difficult term to define accurately, and thereby a difficult act to counter, 
since it covers a plethora of nefarious behaviours that may be conducted wholly or partly 
online, by individuals or groups, upon other individuals, groups, organisations or nations 
(Ngo and Jaishankar, 2017; Afolayan, Plant, White, Jones and Beynon-Davies, 2015; 
Deibert, 2011; Marcum, Higgins, Freiburger and Ricketts, 2010). Rising academic interest in 
cybercrime detection and prevention is evidenced by several recent special issues in journals 
across management, technical and professional disciplines. These include the special issue in 
which this article is published, the Journal of Crime and Justice (Bossler and Berenblum, 
2019), Information Technology & People (Shah, Jones and Choudrie, 2019) and Computers 
and Security (Choo, Gai, Chiaraviglio and Yang, 2020). 
Despite the recent media reports of cyber-attacks, such as the recent ‘ransomware’ attack on 
the UK’s National Health Service that cost over £90 million and resulted in 19,000 medical 
appointments being cancelled (Telegraph, 2018), and numerous efforts by governments and 
expert institutions to improve the cyber-awareness and readiness of organisations, many are 
still underprepared (O’Rourke, 2018). For instance, a study of Ghanaian corporations showed 
that while their knowledge of information technology was good their knowledge of cyber 
issues was poor (Adu, 2018). Similarly, the Cyber Security Breaches Survey (CSBS, 2018), 
that presents a detailed examination of the cyber-attacks and preventive measures of 
commercial organisations and charities in the UK, shows that while both types of 
organisations had suffered from cyber-attacks in the last twelve months (43% of businesses 
and 19% of charities) less than 30% of either had a formal cyber security system in place.  
Some research suggests that cyber-attacks are becoming more frequent, and there is a 
growing body of literature that proffers instruments for assessing cyber risks (Kure, Islam 
and Razzaque, 2018; Bartolini, Ahrens and Zascerinska, 2018; Ali, Almogren, Hassan, 
Rassan and Bhuiyan, 2018). The severity of cyberattacks seems to have plateaued (Xu, 
Schweitzer, Bateman and Xu, 2018), yet a single cyber-attack is estimated to cost an average 
of $229,000. The global cost of cyber-attacks is thought to be several hundreds of billions of 
dollars (RAND, 2018). As a result of this, one third of organisations are planning to take out 
cyber insurance (O’Rourke, 2018). However, this may not be a viable option for SEs that are 
frequently beset by considerable financial constraints. Furthermore, it is questionable whether 
financial compensation for being the subject of cybercrime is a meaningful support for SEs, 
whose purpose is usually socially motivated rather than driven by purely profit. SEs are 
measured not only on their financial performance but also on their societal value or benefit. 
Consequently, just as they find their social value difficult to measure (Ebrahim, et al., 2014; 
Huybrechts and Nicholls, 2013; Zainon, Ahmad, Atan, Wah, Bakar and Sarman, 2014) so is 
the totality of the impact of cyber crime difficult for SEs to measure and therefore insure 
against. 
Despite the recent introduction of the General Data Protection Regulations 2016/679 (GDPR) 
(supplemented in the UK by the Data Protection Act 2018) that mandates the reporting of 
cyber-attacks, it is believed that many instances remain undisclosed. This can be because 
organisations do not perceive it necessary to disclose such information, nor are they aware of 
the legal need to do so, and they are also reluctant to disclose such information since it may 
be reputationally damaging (Amir, Levi and Livne, 2018; Meisner, 2018). Information about 
attacks is also rarely used to improve systems against future attack (Alrimawi, Pasquale, 
Mehta and Nuseibeh, 2018) and this makes it difficult to quantify the precise cost of 
disruptions (Meisner, 2018).  
The acquisition of sensitive data via cyber-attack has increased and this has a deleterious 
effect upon large governmental institutions as well as smaller businesses (Dasgupta, Roy and 
Ghosh, 2018) and charities (Cook and Bernal, 2018; Charity Commission, 2019). For 
example, a ransomware attack upon a local council in the UK was estimated to cost between 
£11m and £18m to repair (Pidd and Robinson, 2020). Small businesses especially, are less 
likely to have adequate cyber defence capabilities than larger organisations (Berry and Berry, 
2018) while 36% of charities are unaware of the types of cybercrime they may be subjected 
to (Charity Commission, 2019). The healthcare sector is at particular risk of cyber-attack due 
to the sensitivity of patient data (Meisner, 2018) and this data is also likely to be disclosed by 
the organisation’s staff (Meng, Li, Wand and Au, 2018). The characteristics of individual 
system users, such as their propensity for risk-taking and gender, are also known to be a 
determinant in cyber security behaviours (Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, Dykstra and Ginther, 
2018). Social engineering attacks, that target individual system users through approaches 
such as phishing, are not only difficult to protect against but are also exceedingly damaging 
(Thomas, 2018; Pathan, 2018). 
The ability of an organisation to prevent or successfully manage cyber-attacks is dependent 
upon numerous factors, including resource constraints as well as the characteristics of 
individual system users. This study assesses SEs ‘preparedness’ to manage cyber security: 
‘Preparedness’ is conceptualised as consisting of several indicators of the measures that 
organisations have in place for managing cyber security and cyber-attacks. These indicators 
are adopted from the CSBS (2018) survey of the cyber-attacks and preventive measures of 
commercial organisations and charities in the UK, augmented with insights that have been 
gained from the extant literature, and broadly comprise the adequacy of financial and human 
resources, possessing policies for cyber security and information technology usage, 
undertaking system tests, and keeping software and hardware up to date.  
Based upon the extant literatures that examine cyber-crime and the characteristics of SEs, the 
following Research Questions (RQ1-6) are generated and are expressed as the conceptual 
framework for this study in Figure 1. 
SEs are chosen as the focus of this research since they are an increasingly important part of 
the economy they have not previously been examined for their cyber-readiness (RQ1, RQ3 & 
RQ6), they are often constrained by their limited financial and expert resources (RQ2 & 
RQ5), they frequently possess sensitive personal information about their staff and clients 
(RQ4), they frequently employ low-skilled and volunteer staff (RQ1 & RQ4), many are 
contracted to deliver local and national government services (RQ4), and their rising success 
as socially and commercially important organisations may be increasing their visibility 
among cybercriminals (RQ1).  
RQ1: The characteristics of the SE influence cyber preparedness. 
 RQ2: Resource constraints influence cyber preparedness. 
 RQ3: A history of cyber-attacks influence cyber preparedness. 
 RQ4: The characteristics of stored data influence cyber preparedness. 
 RQ5: The usage of IT equipment influence cyber preparedness. 
 RQ6: Awareness of cyber risks influence cyber preparedness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RQ1 RQ2 
RQ6 RQ5 
Cyber  
Awareness 
Know about the Cyber 
Awareness Campaign, 10-
step guidance, Cyber 
Essentials Scheme, GDPR. 
 
I.T. Usage 
Use technologies such as 
cloud. 
Staff use personal 
equipment for work. 
Resource 
Constraints 
Money. 
Time. 
Skills. 
 
Social Enterprise 
Characteristics 
Scope of social activity. 
Nature of social activity. 
Size of enterprise. 
 
RQ4 RQ3 Client Data  
Characteristics 
Social Enterprise 
Cyber-Security 
Preparedness 
Cyber  
History 
Experience of cyber-attacks. 
Severity of cyber -attacks. 
 
Employ or work with 
disadvantaged individuals. 
 
Figure 1, SE Cyber-Preparedness Conceptual Framework 
Methodology 
This study employs an interpretive approach in order to understand the factors that influence 
the cyber-preparedness of SEs in the UK. A wide range of interpretive methods have been 
used to garner insight into cyber security issues (Fujs, Mihelic and Vrhovec, 2019) and their 
successful application substantiates the appropriateness of the chosen approach (for example 
Boroujeni, Tajfer and Parhizgar, 2019; Rivituso, 2014). Semi-structured interviews were 
utilised for their ability to gain rich insight into SE owner’s understanding of cyber security 
and the challenges that they face in developing and implementing effective cyber security 
policies and practices (Denscombe, 2010; Fox, 2009; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; 
Seidman, 1998). Maintaining confidentiality and anonymity underpins interpretive research 
(Duclos, 2017) and this was established by obtaining written consent from each participant 
(Li, 2008; Burgess, 2007). 
Interviews of around one hour duration were conducted with twenty-one owner/managers of 
SEs by two of the research team. The participant SEs all operated within one of five Social 
Enterprise UK’s ‘Social Enterprise Places’ (SEP), which are “hotspots of social enterprise 
activity” (SEUK, 2020). These comprised Alston Moor (a village), Digbeth (a quarter), 
Oxfordshire (a county), Plymouth (a city) and Wrexham (a town). Five SEs agreed to take 
part from Oxfordshire, and four from the remaining locations. The nature of the SEs is 
presented in Table 1: the precise location of each SE is not disclosed in order to ensure 
anonymity and to encourage candid exchange of views (Stewart, Gill, Chadwick and 
Treasure, 2008). 
I.D. Type Company Details 
1 Legal Advice Sole trader, in business for 1 year. 
2 Horticulture Sole trader, in business for 3 years, employing on average 
7 volunteer staff, operating in two neighbouring counties. 
3 Café and SE Hub 4 permanent members of staff, in business for 3 years, 
employing over 20 volunteer staff, operating nationally. 
4 Food 4 permanent members of staff, in business for 9 years, 
operating nationwide to hundreds of customers. 
5 Music Therapy Sole trader, in business for 3 years, operating nationwide 
to hundreds of beneficiaries. 
6 Legal Advice Sole trader, in business for 2 years. 
7 Training and Education Sole trader, in business for 5 years. 
8 Mechanical Training  2 permanent members of staff, in business for 3 years, 
operating nationally. 
9 Farm Project. 5 permanent members of staff, in business for 5 years, 
operating nationally. 
10 Media Adviser  Sole trader, in business for 2 years, fifteen local clients. 
11 Prisoner Workshop Sole trader, in business for 6 years, volunteer workforce 
comprises current offenders and three other staff, serving 
the local community. 
12 Clothes Shop 4 permanent members of staff, in business for 4 years, 
serving the local community. 
13 Bike Repairs 11 permanent members of staff, in business for 6 years, 
employing 40 volunteer staff, serving the local county. 
14 Cleaning Service 2 permanent members of staff, in business for 3 years, 
serving the local community 
15 Advice for SE 3 permanent members of staff, in business for 4 years. 
16 Training and Support 4 permanent members of staff, in business for 8 years, 
serving the local county. 
1 Shared Mobility 6 permanent members of staff, in business for 9 years. 
18 Food 3 permanent members of staff, in business for 4 years. 
19 Sustainability Advice Sole trader, startup enterprise. 
20 Music  2 permanent members of staff, in business for 2 years. 
21 Care Services Sole trader. 
Table 1, Participant Social Enterprises 
All responses have been anonymised and participants are identified in the analyses using the 
convention P1, P2…P21 etc. The interview questions were open-ended and operationalized 
from the six Research Questions that were developed from the literature (Halcomb and 
Davidson, 2006; Charmaz, 2006). Questions typically took the form “What do you 
understand by the term cyber security” and further questions were developed during the 
interviews in order to explore salient and emergent themes. Other question were phrased to 
elicit deeper narratives around the participant’s perceptions and experiences and utilised 
terms such as ‘tell me’, ‘what do you think’ and ‘could you describe’ (Charmaz, 2006; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Spontaneous interview questions were crafted to explore emergent 
subjects and this allowed participants the opportunity to express themselves and to illustrate 
their points with meaningful examples and personal stories (Duffy, Ferguson and Watson, 
2002). The interview questions were reviewed and refined after each interview to ensure that 
theoretical saturation was achieved (Samuel and Peattie, 2016; Guest, MacQueen and 
Namey, 2006; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
The data were analysed using thematic analysis (Guest, et al, 2012) following Braun and 
Clarke’s (2006) six-step process (detailed in Table 2): (1) data familiarization, (2) initial 
interpretation, (3) identification of themes, (4) reviewing and agreeing themes, (5) defining 
the dominant themes, and (6) construction of the narrative of the analysis. The process began 
(Step 1) with the interviewers transcribing their interviews verbatim in order to minimise 
misinterpretation (Opdenakker, 2006). Following this (Step 2), each interviewer thematically 
analysed and coded every transcript and then (Step 3) collated the codes into themes. The 
themes were then cross-compared by all four of the researchers in order to reach consensus 
(Step 4). All four of the researchers were again involved in the final analytical stage (Step 5) 
where the overarching, dominant themes were identified. Prior to constructing the written 
narrative of the analyses the thematic interpretation was member validated with two owner-
managers of SEs that took part in the study (Sandelowski, 1993). 
Determining the robustness of interpretive research has been the subject of considerable 
debate (Miles, 1979) and terms such as ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’ should be avoided 
(Johnson, Buehring, Cassell and Syman, 2006). Instead, the research process should 
incorporate a ‘declared in advance’ process (Gronhaug and Olson, 1999; Whittemore, Chase 
and Mandle, 2001) and triangulation (Gronhaug and Olson, 1999; Eden and Huxham, 1996; 
Jick, 1979). The triangulation of interpretive results may be achieved through the utilization 
of multiple research sites and multiple researchers. The similarity of the interpretations of the 
investigating team may then be determined through the calculation of ‘inter-rater reliability’ 
using measures such as Cohen’s Kappa (for two raters) or Fleiss’s Kappa (for multiple raters 
(Castano, Fontanil and Garcia-Izquierdo, 2019; Graversen, Pedersen, Carlsen, Bro, Huibers 
and Christensen, 2019; Hassan, Puteh and Sanusi, 2019; Schwartz, Albin and Gerberich, 
2019). Kappa values are interpreted as 0 (no agreement) to 1 (complete agreement). There is 
some debate over what value constitutes ‘acceptable’ Kappa values. For instance, Landis and 
Koch (1977) declare that values above 0.6 are ‘substantial’ agreement, whereas Altman 
(1991) states that values above 0.6 are ‘good’, while Fleiss et al (2003) class values of 0.41-
0.75 as ‘good’ and values above 0.75 as ‘very good’. In this study, Fleiss’s Kappa was used 
to measure the degree of agreement between the investigators at Steps 4 and 5 of the Braun 
and Clarke (2006) process: at Step 4 Fleiss’s Kappa was 0.65 and at Step 5 was 0.8. These 
measurements, plus the confirmatory member validation, substantiate the claim of ‘very 
good’ robustness of the study. 
Initial Codes Themes Consensus 
of Themes 
Final 
Themes 
Link to 
RQ Researcher 1 Researcher 
2 
Researcher 1 Researcher 
2 
Threat Threat 
Vulnerability Threat Vulnerability Vulnerability RQ1/RQ4 Vulnerability Risk 
 Likelihood 
of attack 
 
History of 
attack 
Experience 
of attack History Experience Experience Experience RQ3 Repeated 
attack 
 
  
Social media Online data 
Data Data 
Data 
(location and 
type) 
Data RQ5 
 Protect 
volunteers 
  
Skills Skills 
Skills Skills & Abilities Skills Skills RQ2 
Personal 
skills 
In-house 
skills 
Volunteers Abilities 
 
Overload Capacity Overload Capacity Overload Overload Emergent 
 
Cost Cost 
Cost Resources Resources Resources RQ2  Time 
 Fines 
 
HELP! Awareness 
of 
Assistance 
Knowledge Awareness Awareness Cyber Awareness RQ6 
Table 2, Data Coding and Analysis 
Findings & Discussion 
This section presents the key findings of the study and is structured according to the order for 
the research questions (RQ1…RQ6). Discussions with the participants around RQ1 and RQ4 
were found to be textually rich and thematically interwoven (as indicated in Table 2) and this 
prompted a revision to the conceptual framework that is finally presented in Figure 2. The 
modified framework also captures the emergent feature of ‘Management Characteristics’, 
discussed within the section on RQ6, that reflects the observations of the limited SE owner-
managers’ absorptive capacities. 
Social Enterprise Characteristics (RQ1 & RQ4) 
Many of the respondents in this study emphasised the vulnerabilities of their organisation and 
of the sector as a whole. While this may be expected to be the response of owner-managers of 
organisations in almost any sector, many of the owner-managers identified unique aspects of 
SEs that make them particularly susceptible to cyber attack: 
I suppose that some of the grant money that we win could be attractive to some 
people. P14 
Some highlighted the specific challenges that the human resources present to those with 
malicious intent, and this is clearly linked with RQ4 that explores the nature of the data that 
is held by the organisation:  
Some of our members have…how can I put it…a colourful past. P11 
That’s another big thing about volunteers, you really have to protect these people as 
well and hold their information safely. P3 
The involvement of volunteers, both as recipients of services and as employees, presents a 
particular problem. Volunteer resources are often poorly skilled (Bullee, Montoya, Pieters, 
Junger and Hartelk, 2018; Rey-Marti et al., 2016; Richards and Reed, 2015; Doherty et al., 
2014; Lui, Takeda and Ko, 2014) and lack experience of digitally-enabled workplaces, and 
this makes them particularly susceptible to social-engineering attacks as well as the improper 
care and use of data and equipment. Additionally, the problem of poor skills is exacerbated 
by the transient nature of volunteers thereby diluting the effect of any training that may be 
provided. The close involvement of SEs with often disadvantaged and vulnerable individuals 
makes them even more susceptible to social engineering attacks, which are inherently hard to 
protect against (Thomas, 2018; Pathan, 2018). Collectively, this evidences RQ1 by 
highlighting that owner-managers recognise that the uniqueness of SEs may make them 
vulnerable to cyber-attack, particularly those that are predicated upon a social-engineering 
approach.  
Resource Constraints (RQ2) 
All of the participants raised the issue of the lack of time or resources that impinges upon 
their ability to take affirmative action to improve their cyber-security, and this is widely 
recognised as a factor that affects all aspects of SE operation (White, Samuel, Pickernell, 
Taylor and Mason-Jones, 2018; Rey-Marti, Ribeiro-Soriano and Palacios-Marques, 2016; 
Katre and Salipante, 2012): 
 The problem is it’s just another thing to consider. P2 
You haven’t got all the resources to be able to look after that. P3 
As a consequence of this, most SEs relied upon the skills of their current staff to deal with 
cyber-security issues. 
We have an IT guy…well, we don’t employ him but he’s a volunteer in our community 
and he comes in and sorts out our computers and things. P12 
I’ve let other people deal with that mire than myself. P17 
Several SEs have taken the step of hiring cyber security expertise and have: 
…a consultant coming in and doing that. P18 
It is notable that the reliance upon ‘casual’ IT skills that may be possessed by human 
resources may, in itself, be inadequate to provide robust protection from potential 
cybersecurity threats (Ani, He and Tiwari, 2019). In many instances, the ‘IT skills’ that are 
possessed by individuals are limited to personal or ‘domestic’ experience of IT. The Charities 
Commission (2019) reports upon the use of trustees that have ‘varied knowledge and 
experience’ yet, due to their age profile are likely to have low levels of cyber awareness and 
therefore make the enterprises ‘more vulnerable to cybercrime’. It may be ventured that the 
utilization of available and volunteer resources imbues SEs and their owner/managers with a 
false sense of reassurance that risks have been addressed properly. Furthermore, it is not 
inconceivable to imagine that a person that is tasked with undertaking IT duties for such an 
organization could become the subject of a cybersecurity attack (Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, 
Dykstra and Ginther, 2018). 
The issue of financial cost was one that frequently arose within discussions and this is widely 
recognised as a problem for all SEs (Martin 2015; Lehner and Nicholls, 2014; Reiser and 
Dean, 2014). Consequently, few SEs are in a position to be able to afford expert support, with 
one owner/manager extolling: 
Even the smallest of fines, that could tip us over the edge really. P6 
Access to money as opposed to support. You can be supported to death, but access to 
actual money would be great. P15 
One participant identified that the cost of improper cyber-preparedness could result in a fine 
that would undermine the organisation’s financial security. This is a subject of perennial 
concern for SE scholars and practitioners alike (Martin 2015; Lehner and Nicholls, 2014; 
Reiser and Dean, 2014). It must therefore be concluded that cost is predominantly a limiting 
factor in cyber-security, however one can surmise that improved awareness of the financial 
consequences of poor cyber-security may influence owner-manager behaviours.  
The views expressed by the participants substantially evidences RQ2, that resource 
constraints influence cyber-preparedness. However, it must be noted that this is a 
multifaceted relationship. In its simplest manifestation, the lack of resources precluded the 
implementation or development of cyber-security initiatives. For a few organisations 
however, the need to be cyber-secure prompted the diversion of financial resources in order 
to secure appropriately skilled IT resources.  
Cyber History (RQ3) 
Some of the participants recalled instances of cyber-attacks that they, or their organisations, 
had suffered. However, all of them were relatively minor, but still damaging (Thomas, 2018; 
Pathan, 2018), comprising phishing or scam emails: 
I constantly get emails and calls from foreign numbers. P3 
 My inbox is always full of spurious emails and requests. P20 
Many, including those that had experience of cyber-crime, downplayed or underestimated the 
risks involved: 
Cyber security isn’t a big concern for us. P9 
To be honest, we’re not overly worried about it. P12 
This is somewhat surprising given that the owner-managers recognised that their 
organisations were vulnerable to cyber-attacks. There was no indication within the data that 
prior experience of cyber-attacks would influence their cyber-preparedness to evidence RQ3 
and this contrasts with the majority situation in charitable organizations whereby 69% 
implemented system revisions following cyber attack (Charity Commission, 2019). This may 
be due to the young age of the organizations and there being little organizational history to 
draw upon: almost half of SEs in the UK are less than five years old (SEUK, 2019). It is also 
possible that those organisations that had experienced minor attacks were those that already 
had adequate protection in place or that the severity of the attacks were not sufficient to 
stimulate cyber-security initiatives: for instance, P3 and P20’s responses (quoted above) 
indicated that they were basing their perceptions upon their experience of having their 
personal email and telephone scammed.  
Client Data Characteristics (RQ4 & RQ1) 
While many of the owner-managers recognised the sensitive nature of the data that they held 
(illustrated by the statements of P5, P14 and P19 in RQ1) in accord with the literature 
(Doherty, Haugh and Lyon, 2014; Samuel, White, Jones and Fisher, 2018), this alone did not 
seem sufficient to instigate cyber-security initiatives. Many of them pointed toward the lack 
of commercially valuable data that they possessed: 
The other reason why it’s not really a threat for us is because we don’t have a lot of 
personal data worth stealing. P17 
We’re not a large charity…we don’t have people’s bank details. P10 
This is important for it indicates that SE owners/managers are aware that some types of data 
are more valuable than others and thereby may increase the likelihood of them being viable 
targets for cyber-attacks. However, many did not perceive the sensitive nature of data that 
they may hold either directly or indirectly about their vulnerable, volunteer resources that 
have ‘colourful pasts’, or about government agencies to which they may provide vicarious 
access (Dasgupta, Roy and Ghosh, 2018). It was expected that the SE owner-managers would 
be aware of the potentially sensitive data that their organizations possess (Doherty, Haugh 
and Lyon, 2014; Samuel, White, Jones and Fisher, 2018). and thereby directly evidence RQ4. 
However, the observation that many did not recognise this important facet of their 
organizations serves to stress the significance of the finding. As was discussed in RQ2, many 
owner-managers have limited commercial experience and their perceptions of cyber risks are 
dominated by ‘domestic’ examples such as scam emails and phishing, even though these may 
still be costly to deal with (Thomas, 2018; Pathan, 2018). This ‘blinkered’ perspective 
appears to be hindering their recognition of the real risks surrounding the data that their 
organizations possess, thereby exacerbating the false sense of security that they may have 
and, along with resource constraints, inhibit their desire and ability to take appropriate action. 
IT Usage (RQ5) 
The nature of the data that the organisation possesses (RQ4) could be expected to have some 
relationship to the usage of IT equipment (RQ5). It was expected, or indeed hoped, that SEs 
would employ IT systems, practices and technologies that would be in accord with the types 
of data that they possessed. However, as also indicated in the evidence for RQ4, there was 
scant reference to the types and usage of IT equipment. A few SE owner-managers referred 
to the use of social media platforms and noted the care that was taken in ensuring that 
sensitive or personal information was not posted: 
We use Facebook a lot, if it’s public stuff, pictures and so on, people can get hold of 
all that, I would never put any information about their lives or addresses on there. P5 
Social media applications are notorious for providing relatively easy access to private and 
personal data for malicious intent (Alguliyev, Aliguliyev and Abdullayeva, 2019; Singh and 
Kaur, 2019; Soomro and Hussain, 2019). SE owner-managers need to be aware of these 
issues and give them due consideration, alongside those of cost and ease-of-use, when 
determining to utilise social media as part of their business proposition or marketing. 
However, scholarly examination of the vagaries of social media adoption in SEs is nascent 
but limited (El-Den, Adhikari and Azam, 2017) and has so far ignored the issue of 
cybercrime and security. 
None of the SE owner-managers highlighted unusual usage of IT in their operations: the 
majority used standard ‘office’ software and some used simple backup systems. 
Consequently, there was little data that evidenced RQ5. This finding may however be 
constrained by the type of SEs that were involved in the study and the nature of the work that 
they undertake. 
Cyber Awareness (RQ6) 
The interpretation of the data in RQ4 suggested that SE owner-managers underplayed the 
risks presented by cyber-attacks, or thought that they were not at risk because they did not 
hold any commercially valuable data. However, further investigation revealed that this was 
not necessarily the case and some SE owner-managers in fact merely considered cyber-
security issues as ‘just another thing to manage’: 
Cyber security threats – I wouldn’t take it particularly any more seriously than I take 
any other threats. P10 
Although unexpected, this is not entirely surprising since SEs are frequently headed by 
socially and ideologically-driven individuals that are focussed upon the social mission of the 
organisation (White et al, 2018). While the commercial dimension of the organisations is 
important, it is seen as a necessity in order to achieve the social mission, and not as an end in 
itself. Consequently, these owner-managers have a rather different mindset to managers of 
predominantly commercial organisations. One may venture that they view all aspects of their 
business equally and thereby cyber-preparedness does not feature prominently within their 
discussions as it may with other types of owners or managers.  
Other SE owners/managers were cognisant of the consequences of cyber-crime upon their 
organisation and the need to take action: 
A data breach would not only harm our reputation but also get us into trouble with 
the Information Commission. P6 
I’ve actually thought to myself that I need to get a more secure email. P8 
Worryingly, while they aware of the importance of cyber-security and the need to address the 
issue, many have yet to act: 
It’s on my to do list. P21 
Most SE owners/managers ascribed this to their lack of understanding of key issues. For 
example: 
When this whole GDPR thing happened…I don’t really know if that’s anything to do 
with cyber security. P5 
I went to these GDPR meetings and you get scared to death about this sort of thing. 
P8 
Many owners/managers commented upon their own personal skills and abilities being 
inadequate: 
Fledgling social entrepreneurs – if it’s never been your field why would you even 
know about it. P21 
The cyber threat…yeah, we’d have to bring somebody in because I haven’t got a clue. 
P8 
Only one SE owner-manager was aware of the Information Commission, and none 
volunteered any knowledge of the various schemes that existed to support organisations in 
developing and implementing cyber-security measures. Even when prompted through 
targeted questions only a few stated that they had heard of the schemes and none had any 
knowledge of their purpose or content or availability. Furthermore, none of the respondents 
knew that formal cyber risk assessment tools existed (see for example: Kure, Islam and 
Razzaque, 2018; Bartolini, Ahrens and Zascerinska, 2018; Ali, Almogren, Hassan, Rassan 
and Bhuiyan, 2018). This is an important finding that evidences RQ6 and has significance for 
those organisations that are responsible for promoting cyber-awareness and preparedness, and 
also for those organisations that represent SEs and communicate contemporary issues with 
their members.  
Allied to this observation is the theme of ‘Overload’ that is presented in Table 1 as an 
emergent issue. ‘Overload’ refers to the frequent mention that was made of the owner-
manager’s capacity to handle ‘everything at once’. This is related to the preceding discussion 
of RQ6 and the nature of the owner-managers themselves and to the discussion of RQ2 
(resources): in giving equal attention to all issues within the organisation, it may be 
impossible for SE owner-managers to dedicate themselves to all issues at once, and may also 
be difficult for them to devolve responsibility for some issues to others, particularly in the 
presence of limited skills and resources. The issue may be one of what Szulanski (1996, p31) 
terms the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the individual, that is, their ability to assimilate new 
information, or one of ‘retentive capacity’, that is, their ability to institutionalise new 
information as new ways of working.  
Summary of Analyses & Discussion 
The analyses support the assertion that the cyber-preparedness of SEs is in need of dedicated 
examination and concur with O’Rourke’s (2018) observation that many organisations are 
poorly prepared to manage their cyber-security, particularly smaller organisation such as SEs 
(Berry and Berry, 2018). While the CSBS (2018) found that around one third of UK 
organisations had cyber-security systems in place, 44% of charities were not adequately 
protected despite 50% of them being the subjects of cybercrime within the past year (Charity 
Digital, 2019). This study suggests that the figure for effective cyber-security systems in SEs 
in the UK may be far lower. Even though the sector as a whole is in need of further 
examination for cyber-security activities, capabilities and preparedness, one of the challenges 
that this sector presents is its inordinate degree of heterogeneity (Samuel et al, 2018; White et 
al, 2018). Consequently, it is difficult to draw generalizable results for the sector because a 
‘representative’ sample is elusive.  
The management and governance structure of SEs is known to be important and problematic 
(Doherty et al., 2014; Lehner and Nicholls, 2014; Reiser and Dean, 2014) and this study 
suggests that the magnitude and multitude of management issues is further problematized 
through the addition of the issues that surround cyber-security. The literature highlights that 
managerial issues may lead to SEs being unable to achieve their social goals (Cornforth, 
2014; Santos et al., 2015; Young and Kim, 2015; Ebrahim et al., 2014) while this study also 
suggests that a lack of attention to cyber-security issues may result in them being unable to 
meet their legal and ethical goals. Recognizing the challenges that best individual owner-
managers of SEs, and the broader managerial challenges that are identified in the extant 
literature, Figure 2 proffers a modified conceptual framework of the factors that influence 
cyber-preparedness in SEs. The pertinent features of each of the antecedents of cyber-security 
that were highlighted through the research are presented in the descriptions. Notably, RQ1 
and RQ4 have been combined within the single factor of ‘Social Enterprise Characteristics’ 
in recognition that discussions of data types and characteristics of the organizations were 
frequently and inextricably intertwined. RQ3 has been modified to read ‘Cyber Experience’ 
to reflect that the majority of owner-managers focused upon their own personal experiences 
rather than the historical experience of cyber attacks within the organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2, 
Antecedents of SE Cyber-Preparedness 
Conclusions 
Cyber-security has become a subject of great interest in the academic literature and even 
greater importance for practicing managers worldwide. The science of cyber-security has 
matured rapidly whereas the practice of managing cyber-security can be perceived to have 
lagged considerably, particularly in smaller organizations (Berry and Berry, 2018). While 
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some large-scale studies have been made of the cyber-security systems and practices in 
different types of organisations, none have as yet examined the social enterprise sector. This 
is problematic since SEs are a rapidly growing sector of the economy and an increasingly 
important facet of modern society in light of the widespread retraction of state-funded social 
support systems. 
This study aimed to understand the factors that influence the cyber-preparedness of social 
enterprises. A series of in-depth examinations were undertaken of the cyber awareness, 
practices and readiness of SE owner-managers in the UK structured around a conceptual 
model that was developed from the extant cyber-security and SE literatures. The study finds 
that very few SEs are aware of the initiatives that are designed to support the development 
and implementation of cyber-security systems and this mirrors findings in other organisation 
types (O’Rourke, 2018; Amir, Levi and Livne, 2018; Meisner, 2018). This is problematic 
since owner-managers recognise that SEs are constrained by a lack of skills and finance, and 
discontinuous staffing that precludes effective cyber training. The use of suboptimal IT 
resources, that are frequently provide by volunteers, may also lead to a false-sense of security 
and inhibit adequate cyber-preparedness. Government agencies are known to be likely targets 
of cybercrime (Dasgupta, Roy and Ghosh, 2018) and security vulnerabilities in SEs may 
afford a ‘gateway’ for their perpetration. In addition, the widespread utilization of social 
media platforms, whilst attractive for their ease-of-use and apparent cost-effectiveness, opens 
up SEs to a growing wave of cybercrime that is conducted through this media. Consequently, 
the SE sector appears to be under-prepared to manage cyber-security issues despite appearing 
to be vulnerable to such an attack. Further efforts are needed to improve the awareness of 
cyber-security assistance schemes. 
The study also indicates the importance of the absorptive capacity of SE owner-managers and 
thereby extends our understanding of the characteristic of individual system users that can 
affect the cyber security of an organization (Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, Dykstra and Ginther, 
2018). This research therefore proffers a contribution to knowledge by theorising the factors 
that induce the adoption and implementation of cyber-security measures in SEs, comprising 
the characteristics of the enterprise, the characteristics of the enterprise management, 
resource constraints, experience of cyber attacks, usage of IT, and awareness of cybersecurity 
schemes and resources. This is the first study to examine these factors in the context of Social 
Enterprise, presented in a conceptual model, and thereby provides a valuable ‘first 
exploration’ into the steps that need to be taken in order to make these organisations ‘cyber 
secure’. 
Limitations 
This study is somewhat limited by its geographic focus upon SEs in the UK, and by virtue of 
its interpretivist approach. Efforts to establish the robustness of the study have been made 
through the calculation of inter-rater reliability and subsequent member validation. However, 
the heterogeneity of the sector insists that generalizations of the findings must be made with 
caution. The study attempted to improve its generalizability through the construction and 
distribution of a survey instrument to facilitate a quantitative examination of the relationship 
between the elements of the conceptual framework. The survey was duly created and 
distributed, with the assistance of Social Enterprise UK (SEUK) to all SEs that subscribe to 
their mailing list via their monthly newsletter and via their Twitter feed (circa 5000 SEs in 
the UK). Despite numerous reminder messages the survey did not return sufficient responses 
to enable a statistically rigorous analysis to be made. This study therefore affords a 
methodological warning to future studies that aim to elicit the participation of SEs: whether it 
is due to a lack of time to devote to requests for participation in surveys, or a lack of 
awareness of the importance of cyber-security issues, or is yet another burden upon owner-
managers’ absorptive capacity, the engagement of SEs in future studies requires careful 
consideration of the methods by which participation may be encouraged and improved. 
Future Research 
Notwithstanding the methodological hurdle of engaging the participation of organizations 
that are severely resource constrained, future research should aim to provide quantitative 
examination of the factors that influence SE cyber-preparedness. The conceptual framework 
proffered in this study may form the basis of a large-scale survey of SEs. The use of survey 
technique may also be a means of confirming and refining the findings of this study in SEs 
outside the UK. Furthermore, useful insight could be gained through case study examination 
of SEs that have experienced and managed cyber-attacks, or have robust cyber-security 
systems and practices from which other organisations could learn. Identifying these cases and 
attracting willing participants may be challenging, but the reports of the Information 
Commission may be useful starting points. It is also imperative that the lack of SE awareness 
of the various cyber initiatives that exist in the UK is examined more closely to improve the 
cyber-preparedness of this valuable and growing sector. Organizations that represent SEs, as 
well as national and local governing bodies, need to review the ways in which they may 
individually and collectively address this need. 
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